I. INTRODUCTION
In August 2012 and again in May 2013, gang members came face-toface with government leaders and representatives of the Organization of American States (OAS). 1 The gang members arrived with hundreds of weapons; they were not there to use these weapons, but rather to lay down their arms as a sign of good faith in their struggle to negotiate a lasting peace. 2 Over the past decade there has been increasing awareness of transnational gangs as a threat to regional security in the Americas. 3 This led Silvia Aguilar, the El Salvadorian Vice-Minister of Justice, to say that " [d] omestic crime and its associated destabilization are now Latin America's most serious security threat." 4 According to a 2012 report by the International Center for Migrant Human Rights, crime is now the main cause of displacement in Central America, and it is comparable to the displacement caused by civil wars in the region in the 1970s and 1980s. 5 In 2011, the Geneva Declaration's Global Burden of Armed Violence Report named El Salvador the country with the world's most violent deaths. 6 Transnational gangs have been linked to shocking displays of violence, drug and human trafficking, as well as extortion. The regional and domestic strategies of the countries most affected have been a blend of suppression 12 This Note briefly reviews the history and development of transnational gangs in Central America. It considers the connection to previous violence in the region and the effects of US immigration policy on the development of gangs. It then delves into the scope of the current problem with the relevant gang violence. This Note reviews the domestic and regional responses to the threat of transnational gangs. It examines various Mano Dura policies throughout Central America, as well as prevention programs and regional agreements and strategies. This Note reviews the available information regarding the truce and the developments that are still happening. It explores the role of the El Salvadorian government and the OAS in negotiating the truce. It also discusses the response from various countries in the region regarding negotiation as a strategy for decreasing violence.
The Note then examines the development of international law, and in particular, the ways in which it seeks to restrict and manage violence through International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL). This Note explores the legal and political limitations of IHL and IHRL in reducing violence in conflicts such as the one in El Salvador. This Note demonstrates how El Salvador's international obligations may inhibit transitional justice and delay the humanitarian goals of the truce. Finally, the Note suggests ways that the international community can support the humanitarian goals embodied in the truce. 
A. The History and Development of Central American Gangs
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) formed in the Rampart and Pico Union neighborhoods of central Los Angeles as Central Americans fled their home countries due to internal conflicts. 25 After their arrival in Los Angeles, "[o]ut of a need for self-protection and to gain control of their new neighborhoods, the criminal elements of Central American newcomers, many of which had prior military and guerrilla training, took up various forms of continuing criminal conspiracies and quickly gained reputations for extreme wantonness and brutality." 26 The MS-13 quickly gained a reputation for employing unusual and violent tactics including the use of machetes in gang attacks. 27 From Los Angeles, the MS-13 spread nationwide. 28 "Although FBI officials have described MS-13 as a 'loosely structured street gang,' it has expanded geographically, and may pose an increasing national and regional security threat as it becomes more organized and sophisticated." 29 In 2004, the National Drug Intelligence Center reported that "the gang was increasing its coordination between chapters in Los Angeles, Washington D.C., Northern Virginia, and New York, perhaps indicating efforts to create a national command structure." 30 In the 1960s, Barrio 18 (also known as M-18, the 18th Street Gang, and Pandilla 18) was formed by Mexican immigrants in the Rampart section of Los Angeles. 31 They were not accepted by existing MexicanAmerican gangs. 32 It was the first Hispanic gang to accept members from all races, to recruit members from other states, and to grow its ranks by becoming one of the first multiracial, multiethnic gangs in Los Angeles. 33 After the 1992 Los Angeles riots, police attributed much of the 24 . MANWARING, supra note 3, at 12. 25. Luz E. Nagle violence and looting to local gangs. 34 In the years following, California passed strict, new tough-on-crime laws like the "three strikes and you're out" legislation in 1994 . 35 The effect of this legislation was a dramatic increase in California's prison population. 36 Additionally, the US Congress passed the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, which made it easier to deport criminals. 37 The combination of these legislative changes led to the deportation of thousands of convicted felons to El Salvador. 38 "Between 2000 and 2004, an estimated 20,000 criminals were sent back to Central America." 39 The proliferation of maras in Central America is attributable in large part "to a United States immigration and criminal justice policy that deports foreign-born criminal convicts back to their countries of origin following incarceration . . . . [F] or several years the United States has been pouring tens of thousands of criminals, including extremely violent offenders, into Central America's weakest and most failing states." 40 Until recently, rules also prohibited the US government from sharing the returnees' criminal history with the governments of their countries of origin. 41 After deportation, gang members arrive in their countries of origin "as pariahs in places unfamiliar or unknown to them, unwelcome, and with no basis of support to assimilate and to stay out of trouble." 42 It has been observed that a lack of strong familial connections in the region and a lack of fluency in Spanish leaves these individuals isolated and " [r] etaining their gang lifestyle can be their only means of surviving and thriving." 43 Upon return, deportees introduced California gang culture to their 34. MANWARING, supra note 3, at 16. 35. MANWARING, supra note 3, at 16. "In 1994, California legislators and voters approved a major change in the state's criminal sentencing law, (commonly known as Three Strikes and You're Out). The law was enacted as Chapter 12, Statutes of 1994 (AB 971, Jones) by the Legislature and by the electorate in Proposition 184. As its name suggests, the law requires, among other things, a minimum sentence of 25 years to life for three-time repeat offenders with multiple prior serious or violent felony convictions. The Legislature and voters passed the Three Strikes law after several high profile murders committed by exfelons raised concern that violent offenders were being released from prison only to commit new, often serious and violent, crimes in the community. 60. Nagle, supra note 25, at 10-11. 61. Nagle, supra note 25, at 10-11. According to the document released by the leaders of M-18 and MS-13 regarding the truce, "No one can object that we too are Salvadorians and that we are a social byproduct of the horrible socio-economic policies derived from the models that have been implemented in El Salvador for many years, including sending us to war in the 1980s, a war that we are considered sons of, because the majority of our members lost our fathers in this conflict, others of us are members of homes ripped apart by the effects of the emigration of our fathers and ourselves, to other countries and by the uprooting of being displaced from our places of origin." Los Voceros Nacionales de la Mara Salvatrucha MSX3 67 experts argue "although gangs may be more visible than other criminal groups, gang violence is only one part of a broad spectrum of violence in Central America." 68 Various sources indicate that MS-13 and M-18 are involved in a variety of other criminal enterprises and are connected with various organized criminal elements. The increased intensity of the War on Drugs in Mexico has reportedly led traffickers to use Central America as a transshipment point for US-bound Andean cocaine, with at least 42 percent of that US-bound cocaine stopping in Central America. 69 In part of MS-13's and M-18's criminal network that includes connections throughout the region and in Spain, El Salvador has become a major transshipment point for drug trafficking and human smuggling. 70 Some gang members even serve as "foot soldiers" for more organized drug trafficking organizations in Mexico. 71 The gangs have grown their criminal activities to include: drug and weapons smuggling and distribution, human trafficking and prostitution, kidnapping, assassinations for hire, extortion, protection
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LA MANO EXTENDIDA 775 racketeering, and larceny. 72 Although there has been some concern that terrorist groups, like alQaeda, could use transnational gangs to gain access to the United States, there does not, at the time of this Note's writing, seem to be any evidence to suggest such a connection. 73 In fact, "analysts have found no links between Central American gangs and Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups." 74 But still, some researchers assert that the MS-13 gang and terrorist groups are similar in that they both have "a propensity for indiscriminate violence, intimidation, [and] The parallels between the operations of transnational gangs and terrorist organizations not only leads some to fear the potential for future collaboration, but also raises an important question about what tactics should be used to combat the violence. Some say that the growth of the transnational gangs "poses a significant concern for long-term security and stability in our hemisphere," 76 and call mareros "the perfect storm in terms of an autonomous quasi-fighting force capable of carrying out unspeakable violence against civil societies in the Americas." 77 Because of membership numbers in the tens of thousands and their military grade weapons, "the two gangs are virtual armies that have the power to affect the security of the entire region." 78 Some predict a shift in the status of gangs from "being a scourge of civil society to becom[ing] a serious paramilitary threat to national and regional security, prompting a military response to deteriorating socio-political conditions." 79 It has been argued that " [l] Accordingly, such conflicts have "no formal declarations or terminations of conflict; no easily identified human foe to attack and defeat; no specific territory to take and hold; no single credible government or political actor with which to deal; and no guarantee that any agreement between or among contending protagonists will be honored" relegating everyone, everywhere, part of the "battle space." 83 
IV. "TRADITIONAL" RESPONSES TO TRANSNATIONAL GANGS

A. Domestic Approaches: Mano Dura y Mano Amiga
In the mid-2000s, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras cracked down on gangs in a set of programs collectively called Mano Dura (which translates to the firm hand or heavy-handed), a program the effectiveness of which has been called into question. 84 Since then, countries have also incorporated more preventative tactics often termed Mano Amiga (which translates to the friendly hand). 85 Mano Dura approaches usually increased sentences for "gang membership or gang-related crime" and involved the mass incarceration of youth for illicit association. 86 90 Although the crackdown initially reduced crime (an 80-percent decline in kidnapping and a 60-percent decline in youth gang violence) and was popular among the people, it raised human rights concerns. 91 The US State Department's February 2005 Human Rights Report said that "death squads" had been formed to target youth gang members; in March 2005, the Honduran government announced an investigation into the allegations. 92 There are also concerns about prison overcrowding. 93 In May 2004, 104 inmates, many of them gang members, died in a fire in the San Pedro Sula prison. 94 In February 2012, more than 300 inmates perished in a fire at the Comayagua prison. 99 While these laws provided some protections for accused minors, it also enhanced police power to search and arrest gang members. 100 At first, it appeared the reforms were working. Approximately 60,000 young Salvadorans were incarcerated during the first three years of the program 101 106 The United Nations, concerned about possible human rights abuses, said that "the tough measures only strengthened the gangs' resolve and forced continuing criminal enterprises and acts of violence, such as burglary, kidnapping, and recently, massive extortion, to be directed from within prison walls."
107 Non-profit organizations in El Salvador have asked that the government turn its attention away from Mano Dura policies and toward the rehabilitation of gang members. 108 The overcrowding in prisons and the resulting inter-gang violence led to the death of many inmates. 109 There are also reports of extrajudicial killings of youth, especially suspected gang members, or recent returnees, by groups of vigilantes.
110 These attacks are noted by the leaders of MS-13 and M-18 in the document they released regarding the truce, which pled the request "that [members] aren't discriminated against and that we aren't oppressed for the simple fact that we are tattooed, without having committed any type of crime."
111 Ex-gang members report that employers will not hire them. 112 In response to Mano Dura, gangs have changed their behavior, such as avoiding visible tattooing, to avoid detection. 113 The new president of El Salvador, Mauricio Funes, "has increased funding for prevention programs to roughly 14% of the Ministry of Security's budget (from a historic average of just over 1%)." 114 
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Other Countries' Initiatives
Panamanian President Martin Torrijos initiated Mano Amiga in September 2004. 115 It provides "positive alternatives," like theatre or sports, to gangs for at-risk youth aged fourteen to seventeen. 116 The program is supported by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and provides services to more than 10,000 youth.
117 Also, the Ministry of Social Development administers job training and rehabilitation services to former gang members.
118 Panama was approved for a $22.7 million loan by the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB) to fund these and other programs aimed at preventing youth violence.
119
Nicaragua also adopted a youth crime prevention strategy focused on family, school, and community intervention. 120 The Ministry of the Interior, supported by funding from the IDB, has a program to target at-risk youth in eleven different municipalities. 121 Costa Rica is also known to favor the "preventive and rehabilitation oriented approach."
122
Guatemala introduced Mano Dura legislation in 2003, which never passed, but the Guatemalan government has executed "periodic law enforcement operations to round up suspected gang members."
123
Concerned about past abuses in Guatemala, many human rights organizations "oppose any measures that would strengthen law enforcement's power to fight the gangs."
124
In June 2010, Belize became the first country to try a direct approach by negotiating a safe zone truce with localized criminal gangs, in exchange for jobs programs for gang members and provides avenues for mediation of conflicts.
125 At the end of 2012, Belize announced that the program would come to an end due to a lack of funding. 126 Many critics of the program argued that it had strengthened the gangs by providing them with funding 115. RIBANDO, supra note 29, at 4. 116. RIBANDO, supra note 29, at 4. 117. RIBANDO, supra note 29, at 4. 118. SEELKE, supra note 13, at 11. 119. SEELKE, supra note 13, at 11-12. 120. RIBANDO, supra note 29, at 4. 121. SEELKE, supra note 13, at 11. 122. SEELKE, supra note 13, at 11-12. 123. SEELKE, supra note 13, at 10. [Vol. 24:3 and had done little to prevent violence in the long term.
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B. Multilateral/Regional Approaches: Suppression and Prevention
There have been a number of regional, bilateral, and multilateral measures to address the issues presented by transnational gangs. In March 2005, the presidents of El Salvador and Guatemala agreed to set up a joint security force to address gang activity along their border. 128 In April 2005, at a meeting in Honduras, Central American heads of state discussed "coordinating security and information-sharing initiatives to fight the gangs."
129 Another regional example includes the signing of a multilateral agreement by Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico to combat "narco-terrorism and criminal gangs." 
US Efforts
The United States has worked to build several bilateral or multilateral solutions to the gang problem on the North American continent. In 2004, the FBI established an MS-13 National Gang Task Force to coordinate local, state, and federal investigations. 131 On February 23, 2005, it announced the creation of a liaison office in San Salvador to coordinate regional information-sharing and anti-gang efforts. 132 In October 2007, the Bush Administration proposed the Mérida Initiative, an anti-crime and counterdrug program for Mexico and Central America.
133
In 2010, the funding from the Merida Initiative -Central America was directed into a separate program, the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). 134 The primary goals of CARSI are: 137 Although the idea behind CARSI was to combine suppressive and preventative measures, "the majority of the money . . . is allocated for security forces," which comprises 73 percent, and not social programs (only 27 percent of funds).
138
The US State Department also offers the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in San Salvador, which provides training and assistance to Central American law enforcement officials, and "established a model police precinct in Villanueva, Guatemala."
139 "In January 2008, INL sent a Regional Gang Advisor to El Salvador to coordinate its Central American gang programs." 140 The US Agency for International Development (USAID) has funded several programs including one program in partnership with the Central American Integration System (SICA), the Regional Youth Alliance USAID-SICA, which seeks to provide funding to NGOs in targeted communities to support community leaders and youth programs, along with other preventative programming. 
The Role of Intergovernmental Organizations
Several Intergovernmental Organizations have addressed the issues related to transnational gangs in Central America. SICA has allowed Central American leaders and officials to meet regularly, "often accompanied by their U.S. and Mexican counterparts, to discuss ways to 135 142 This cooperation led to a regional security plan that was adopted in 2007. 143 In the plan, the leaders agreed "to designate transnational gang liaison offices in each country" to collect and share information, conduct investigations, and build a regional database on gangs. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) "has supported small arms control; police reform; violence reduction; and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs in Central America," and "conducted research projects on the costs of violence in particular countries and published a comprehensive regional study on security challenges facing Central America. March of 2012, mediators held a press conference to announce that El Salvador's two largest gangs, MS-13 and M-18, had reached a truce. 151 The truce was negotiated between gang leaders from the two groups in prison with the help of mediators Raúl Mijango, a former lawmaker, and Msgr. Fabio Colindres, the military chaplain.
152 By March, the two groups had made arrangements to call an end to violence and the recruiting of children.
153 At first, the government was reluctant to acknowledge its part in the negotiations, but eventually it became clear that the Security Ministry had been involved in the negotiations and that the truce was, to some degree, aided by the government's agreement to move several prisoners to less restrictive facilities. 154 According to the Salvadorian Security Ministry, the truce led to a 32 percent drop in homicides in the first half of 2012, a 50 percent reduction in kidnappings, and a 10 percent decline in extortion.
155
According to official national police statistics, the number of homicides decreased 41 percent in 2012 compared to 2011.
156 "The truce period also brought about El Salvador's first day free of murder in three years."
157
After announcing the truce, Raul Mijango released a document, later authenticated by gang members, stating the position of the gangs. 158 The document says that the group does not "wish to keep making war," and that Since last year we have begun internally a deep process of reflection and analysis of the serious and pressing problems facing our country, of which we have been part . . . after 20 years we have been able to reach an agreement between the two rival gangs where we have managed . . . to significantly reduce the murders in the country, and, in a gesture of goodwill, to cancel all actions that include attacks against soldiers, police and guards.
159
The document also made it clear that the leaders consider this process We are people who play with life, principally with our own lives because we have nothing to lose . . . . It is necessary to understand once and for all that we are a social phenomenon and that the war that we have seen ourselves as obligated to fight has socioeconomic causes and more than anything its solutions is not only legal and by repression, but also by social and economic means.
160
They also asked for the support of Salvadorians generally: "Give us the opportunity, support our guides, and don't give credit to obtuse positions that as in the past, always opposed and boycotted rational and peaceful solutions and provoked the extension of a conflict that caused tens of thousands of deaths." 161 The truce has been compared by some gang members to the one that halted the twelve-year civil war in 1992.
162 Ludwig Rivera, a Barrio 18 leader, said: "It's not that the truce is weak. We feel it is strong. But the lack of involvement of the authorities and the public could make it weak. They all think we are animals, but we have rights and we are taking a step, so they should take a step."
163
A. Phase Two: Peace Zones
In November 2012, the mediators of the negotiations in El Salvador announced a second phase of the truce that would establish peace zones, where particular municipalities would be designated as "special zones of peace" with gangs agreeing to non-aggression and a stop to extortion, kidnapping, theft, and murder. 164 According to the negotiators' proposal, these peace zones would include the following: a non-aggression pact between gangs; an obligation to reduce and eradicate criminal activity including extortion; a voluntary disarmament of gangs; the establishment of community collectives made up of gang members that would work on development in the community; a delegation of Policía Nacional Civil (PNC) consisting mostly of community police; an end to the police tactics of gang roundups and night raids and to policies that criminalize gang 160 identity; cooperation between government and business to improve the job market for youth, including gang members that have left behind crime; a prioritization of mental health campaigns and cultural education by the government; and a local citizen crime-watch. 165 In early December 2012, the leaders of MS-13, Barrio 18, and three smaller street gangs (Mao Mao, Mirada Locos, and La Maquina) agreed to the terms of the proposal, submitted a list of ten municipalities where they would be willing to have peace zones and ordered members in those cities to begin disarming. 166 However, President Funes refused to accept the terms of the proposal, which included a repeal of the 2009 anti-mara law, and an end to night raids. 167 While defending the 2009 anti-mara law as a "valid instrument of the law, which has shown efficacy," he also said that it could be made more "efficient," leaving the door open for further negotiations about the amendment of the statute. 168 In January, the first Peace Zone was instituted in Ilopango, a town near the capital. 169 In February, Defense Minister Alito Benitez announced that the military would also withdraw from peace zones, so that they could focus on crime in other areas.
170
While the peace zone program appeared to be working, the truce has not completely stopped the violence in these communities. In September 2013, in Ilopango, four members of the Barrio 18 were killed while gang leadership met for peace talks nearby. 171 The leaders of MS-13 and Barrio 18, along with the mayor of Ilopango all claimed that the murders were not carried out by gang members but rather by those who wished to undermine [Vol. 24:3 the truce-even suggesting that perhaps the murders had been executed by Salvadorian security forces. 172 Salvadorian police denied this claim.
173
Regardless of who was responsible, these events have "cast a shadow" over the peace process.
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B. Strain on the Truce
These "shadows" have haunted the peace process in El Salvador from the beginning, with critics citing continued violence and extortion as signs of bad faith negotiation by the gangs and as signals that the truce is a sham. 175 The truce has not totally stopped violence among gang members. In September 2012, two bosses of MS-13 were killed by underlings who sought to enforce the truce by preventing the bosses from killing rival gang members. 176 Critics of the gang truce have also claimed that some murders have been in retaliation against those in El Salvador who have spoken out against the truce.
177 According to a recent report by the International Assessment and Strategy Center, gang members who opposed the truce may have been murdered to silence dissent. 178 Critics explain the lower homicide rate has not resulted from an actual reduction in violence, but a shift from open killing in the street to "disappearance."
179 These accusations are difficult to substantiate because of the government's poor tracking of statistics in cases of disappearance.
180 However, such theories have been supported recently by the increase in the number of mass graves, and the number of reported disappearances in the first months of 2013. 181 183 This data shows that while homicides have decreased overall, they have increased in 30 percent of municipalities. 184 Another recent development is that a higher percentage of homicides are now being attributed to gangs, although the methods for attributing homicides to gangs versus non-gangs are murky. 185 However, it is important to recall that the current homicide rate is still far below what it was preceding the truce. When comparing the first seven months of the truce to the second seven months of the truce, there was actually a decrease in the overall number of homicides. 186 Recent reports have shown that the majority of the more than 500 weapons handed over by gangs as part of the truce were not in working order. 187 Those who oppose the truce say that this is evidence of bad faith by the gangs.
188
While the truce is still fully in effect, the news regarding developments throughout 2013 were mixed in large part due to the political climate in El Salvador as the presidential election approached. According to a public opinion poll conducted by La Universidad Technologica de El Salvador, 47 percent of Salvadorians believe that the gangs benefit most from the truce. 189 In the same survey, only 16 percent of respondents indicated the general population benefited the most, 8.7 percent stated that the political parties benefited the most, and 13.3 percent that the government benefited most. 190 Sixty-eight percent of respondents thought that the truce was for political ends, and 50 percent thought it had not INSIGHT CRIME (Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/disappearancesclandestine-graves-rise-el-salvador, archived at http://perma.cc/7JN4-2MJ4. 191 In a poll conducted by the Public Opinion Institute, when asked if the gang truce had reduced crime, 42 percent of respondents said "not at all," 30 percent said only a "little," and 10 percent responded, "a lot." 192 The most negative views of the truce's impact are held by "lower-middle," "working class," and "marginal" social groups. 193 Additionally, an indication of the political nature of the gang truce is that "those with the most negative opinions are members of the Grand Alliance for National Unity (GANA) and the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) parties-that is to say, the opposition parties." 194 Many politicians supportive of the truce have found themselves caught in the political crosshairs as election season heats up. Some government officials and legislators have criticized and demanded investigation into truce broker and former Congressman Raul Mijango.
195
Additionally the El Salvadorian Attorney General has accused former Minister of Security David Munguia Payes of ordering a halt to security operations against fourteen gang structures in San Salvador as part of the truce. 196 The new Security Minister, Ricardo Perdomo, has been critical of the results of the truce, citing it as a cause of expansions of narcotrafficking in the country among other concerns. 197 When asked what accounts for the differences in position between himself and his predecessor, Perdomo said that it was because President Funes had instructed him to "conform to reality." 198 However, in October 2013, a former government-member-turned-opposition-party-member accused Minister Perdomo of taking actions supporting the truce-such as letting gang members leave prison to participate in a meeting of a local religious sect and to answer questions about the truce. 199 In May, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice removed Minister Munguia Payes from his post finding that the post should be held by a civilian. 201 With the removal of Payes, the murder rate began to rise, 202 leading to speculation that the gangs were responding with violence for removal of their strongest governmental ally. 203 This belief was further supported by statements made by the truce broker Raul Mijango, which indicated that the increase in violence was in retaliation for restrictions placed on imprisoned gang members by new Security Minister Ricardo Perdomo. 204 The gangs' official position according to a press conference and subsequent press release is that they intend to maintain the conditions of the truce if the new Security Ministry officials renew the commitments of the outgoing minister, but they warn that the Supreme Court decision "puts the security of Salvadorians at risk." 205 These new developments have led some to question the viability of the truce when the negotiating position of the gangs is based entirely on violence. Florida International University Professor of International Relations, Jose Miguel Cruz, has noted that in order for the gangs to continue to wield negotiating power, they rely on the existence of violence, which is the very thing the terms of the truce aim to eradicate. 206 Others have criticized the truce because of the position it puts the government in. While gangs have agreed to reduce violence, extortion continues until they have legitimate alternatives, thus creating a catch-22 for the government: "[T]he gangs cannot be permitted to continue carrying out criminal activities, but if law enforcement continues to pursue them with the hardline 'mano dura' (iron fist) policies previously in place, it may derail the whole sparks-political-spat-over-el-salvador-truce, archived at http://perma.cc/CY7T-EZUA. In spite of the mounting trouble surrounding the truce, the maras remain committed. According to a statement released by the gangs in September 2013, their commitment to the truce was unbreakable. 208 The statement also emphasized that the mareros, who planned to vote, were watching the elections closely and evaluating each candidate's plan for public security. 215 In spite of criticism, Blackwell has given the truce his full support and plans to move forward with the formation of a technical committee to help formalize the process as it moves forward and to potentially produce documents and more formal agreements.
209
C. Blessing of the OAS
216
Blackwell was also present at the laying down of arms in May 2013. 217 The OAS again evaluated the progress in the peace process in September 2013. In May 2013, Honduran officials announced that Barrio 18 and the MS-13 had begun a peace process similar to that of their Salvadorian counterparts. 222 However, the Honduran version of a truce has yet to yield any decrease in the homicide rate. 223 In fact, murders in the twenty-eight days following the truce were up from the twenty-eight days preceding it.
218
D. Reaction by States in the Region
224
Honduras's ability to reproduce the results of the truce in El Salvador may be impeded by the less centralized nature of the Honduran gangs and the more disparate causes of violence apart from gang activity.
225
While Central American countries have expressed interest in the truce, American officials have kept their distance. Mari Carmen Aponte, the American ambassador to El Salvador, said, "[w]e think that, yes, it has reduced crime, but long-range, sustainably, we feel that we have to address the root causes in order to be effective and for any reduction to be sustainable."
226 Despite this cautionary approach, Aponte reiterated that the embassy supports after-school programs and community policing efforts.
227
In October 2012, the US Treasury Department designated the MS-13 as a "transnational criminal organization," a status that allows the government to seize its assets and prohibits banks from doing business with the mara. [Vol. 24:3 saying that it overestimated the financial sophistication of the MS-13 by putting it on par with organizations such as the Zetas of Mexico and the Camorra of Italy. 229 There has been speculation that the classification was an attempt by the US government to controvert the positive image that the MS-13 has gained from the truce and to make it more difficult politically for the Funes administration to support the truce going forward. 230 Others speculated that this might be a sign of the Obama administration attempting to support the truce by putting more pressure on MS-13 and increasing the Salvadorian government's leverage in negotiations. 231 Sources inside the US Treasury and Homeland Security Departments denied any connection between the classification and the truce. 232 They instead insisted that the classification was based on new information of a strong cross-border relationship among the organization's members and that clicas in the United States seek dispute resolution from and send money to the gang's leaders in El Salvador. 233 Despite the sources' insistence that there was no connection between the truce and the classification of the MS-13 as a transnational criminal organization, the timing remains suspect. 234 While not indicating hostility to the truce, the government sources indicated that the US will retain the classification even if MS-13 becomes a legitimate organization in El Salvador as a result of negotiations there. 235 In January 2013, the US State Department also updated its travel warning for El Salvador citing the high level of violence in the country.
236
While the warning acknowledges the reduction in violent crime due to the truce, it notes that the sustainability of such a decline is unclear. 237 The 229. Geoffrey Ramsey, El Salvador President: U.S. 'Overestimating' MS-13, INSIGHT CRIME (Oct. 14, 2012), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/el-salvador-president-usoverestimating-ms-13, archived at http://perma.cc/PK8Q-BNMZ. Although the classification of MS-13 by the Treasury Department and the travel warning issued by the State Department are not attempts to directly undermine the truce, they could damage its viability. An important aspect of the re-integration of mareros into Salvadorian society involves jobs and economic development. According to a recent report by Americas Society and Council of the Americas, several multinational corporations, including Microsoft, are engaged in economic development in the region. 239 Some of these companies have specific jobs programs for ex-mareros. 240 If the truce is to succeed, additional programs will need to be initiated. 241 However, the report emphasizes that such efforts will only work if they are also financially beneficial to the corporations. 242 The signals that the United States has been sending regarding the gangs in El Salvador may make some corporations think twice before relocating jobs to the country, and especially before creating jobs programs for ex-gang members.
In early 2013, then-Security Minister David Munguia Payes and truce-broker Bishop Fabio Colindres went to Washington to request funding to support the efforts of the truce; they visited the offices of Rubén Hinojosa, Mike Honda, Mark Werner, Mathew Salmon, and Javier Becerra and were roundly rejected. 243 In June, the United States approved $91.2 million in funding for security programs in El Salvador; provisions for the truce, however, were conspicuously absent. 244 This lack of US support leaves questions about the economic feasibility of the truce going forward. [Vol. 24:3
E. Looking to the Past to Build Solutions Moving Forward: Esquipulas III
The year 2012 marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Esquipulas II Accord, 245 an agreement among Central American nations to work for peace in the region. Recently, former Guatemalan President Vinicio Cerezo suggested that a new Esquipulas Accord could help combat violence, corruption, and inequality in Central America. 246 The original Esquipulas moved away from military solutions and sought dialogue and negotiation, democratization and peace. 247 Such an agreement could address security concerns and alleviate economic inequality and corruption, which contribute to gang violence in the region. Such an agreement could also lay a foundation for further dialogue and economic development that would support the continuation of the peace process in El Salvador.
VI. THE ROLE AND EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE TRUCE IN EL SALVADOR
While the effects of the violence perpetrated by maras are highly localized, as evidenced by the viability of the "peace zones," the problem of transnational gangs is an international problem. The maras are themselves international in nature spanning all of North America and even into Europe. 248 The response to maras has also often been regional, multi-lateral, or international. 249 Additionally, the level of violence and displacement caused by maras, especially in the Northern Triangle, has reached levels that rival the civil wars of the 1970s and 1980s. 250 What role does international law play in the viability of the peace process in El Salvador, or other efforts to reduce marero violence moving forward?
A. A Brief History of the Development of International Law and Its Relationship to Violence
The historical development of international law has to a large extent been precipitated by conflict and war. is usually traced to the sixteenth century and the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which concluded the Thirty Years War. 251 The next era in international law was marked by the Paris Peace Conference and the treaties ending World War I, which demarcated an unsuccessful attempt to regulate the use of force through international law. 252 The subsequent phase of international law was precipitated by both World War II and the UN Charter of 1945 and was characterized by prohibition on the use of force.
253
This era ended with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989. 254 Since 1989 there have been two phases, one lasting from the fall of the USSR until 2001, and the other commencing with the attacks of September 11. 255 The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent transition to a multipolar world "reinforced the trend toward an expanded role for international institutions in the management and peaceful resolution of conflicts."
256 During this period, there were an abundance of peace agreements, often brokered with UN involvement, which aimed to end internal wars. 257 The period also saw substantial developments in some of the most high-profile conflicts of the time such as the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, the South African Civil war, and the troubles in Northern Ireland.
258
A major, overarching phase in contemporary international law was precipitated by the attack on the World Trade Centers on September 11, 2001, and is characterized by a "subjugation of international law to international politics and US hegemony." 259 The World Trade Center attacks have affected the international security system, anti-terrorism policy, and conflict-management approaches. 260 As in Central America with the maras, a traditional approach to counter-terrorism focuses on coercive governmental action and avoidance of dialogue or negotiation with terrorist groups. 261 between a government and a terrorist group legitimates the terrorists and weakens the moral authority of the State. 262 Opponents of dialogue also argue that a "peace process" is only a change in tactics on the part of a terrorist organization, rather than a legitimate expression of surrendering the threat of violence, which gives them power. 263 
B. The Development of International Humanitarian Law which Governs Internal Armed Conflict
International Humanitarian Law (IHL), or "the law of war," was developed to protect people from the consequences of unchecked violence. 264 However, while this is the goal of IHL, "realistically one can simply require international law to mitigate at least some of the most frightful manifestations of the clash of arms. This is precisely what the rules of warfare endeavor to do." 265 Traditional law governing such conflict "was either restated and codified, or developed, at the Brussels Conference of 1874 and at The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907." 266 The rules embodied in these conventions applied only to inter-State armed conflicts, and fighting by insurgents remained under the rule of domestic criminal law (unless the State granted the insurgents belligerency). 267 There were a few specific prohibitions of weapons under the rules, and some general principles put into place; for example, belligerents could determine how to enforce compliance with IHL, either via belligerent reprisals or prosecution and punishment under the laws of war.
268
During World War II, many new classes of combatants emerged, such as resistance movements in the German occupied territories. However, these combatants were not recognized as "lawful combatants" under the Hague codification. 269 Additionally, as guerrilla warfare spread throughout the colonial world, countries felt that guerrillas, who did not fit within the traditional definition of "combatants," "should be upgraded to the status of lawful combatants subject to conditions." 270 The increase in "wars of the poor," or struggles for national liberation waged by liberation movements and carried out by guerrillas, civil wars (often in less-powerful countries, but backed on either side by world super-powers), and terrorism rendered
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LA MANO EXTENDIDA 797 the Hague codification defective and inadequate to address the realities of emerging warfare. 271 These developments led States to first adopt the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and then later two Protocols in 1977. 272 While these Conventions and Protocols take into consideration the growing involvement in armed conflict of both civilians and civilian installations, they maintain the basic distinction between combatants and persons who do not take part in hostilities.
273 Also, after the attacks of September 11, 2001, there was a shift by the United States from addressing "terrorism" under domestic law to utilizing IHL-for example, with how the US defined terrorism for the war waged by the US-led coalition in Afghanistan. 274 Throughout history, IHL has shifted to encompass new and emerging types of armed conflict; however the contours of marero violence has not as of yet been specifically addressed by IHL.
C. The Current Legal Regulation of Internal Armed Conflict (IAC)
Although marero violence is transnational in nature, much of the actual combat is limited to single nations. The law governing internal armed conflict is shaped largely by the inherent conflict between "lawful" governments (whose interest is in regarding rebels as criminals without international status) and the non-State rebels (who want to be internationally recognized). 275 International law generally used to be conceived of as only applying to State actors and only being made by sSate actors. 276 However, a more modern approach is that international law regulates the rights and obligations of non-State actors, such as individuals, international bodies, NGOs, and armed groups. 277 In line with this, "[a]ll rules governing the struggle between the lawful government and insurgents have one main feature in common: they do not grant rebels the status of lawful belligerents. In the eyes of both the government against which they fight and of third-party States, rebels remain criminals infringing domestic penal law. Typically, "States prefer to leave fighting substantially unrestricted on the clear assumption that, being militarily stronger than insurgents, they may quell rebellion more easily by remaining untrammeled by law." 281 Thus far in El Salvador, this has been the policy toward marero violence and conflict. The Salvadorian government has attempted to address the issue with domestic criminal law reforms (such as Super-Mano Dura) and increased police and military enforcement of such laws.
D. The Limitations of IHL
Practically speaking, it is unclear whether IHL as currently applied has a role to play in the regulation of the gang warfare that plagues Central America. The continuity and intensity of the violence in El Salvador and surrounding countries rises to the level of many recognized inter-State conflicts and to the level of the intra-State conflicts that plagued the region in the 1970s and 1980s; the gangs may have reached sufficient levels of sophistication and control of territory in order to meet the definitional standards laid out under some of the IHL standards, but application can be politically difficult.
282
A major limitation to the application of IHL is that the ultimate determinative question of whether a conflict rises to the level necessary to be governed by IHL must be determined by an international body such as the ICJ, UN Security Council, or the UN Commission on Human Rights.
283
Due to the nature of international bodies, it is quite possible that a given conflict may never arrive in front of one of these decision makers, or that it may take a long time. However, until an international body determines the application of one of these definitions, the State has the power to determine the nature of the conflict. 284 Finally,
[o]ver the years mankind has witnessed steady progress in the sophistication, the devastating effects, and the cruelty of weapons and methods of combat. law is beset with deficiencies, loopholes, and ambiguity. 285 It is in large part because of these ambiguities and loopholes, along with States' resistance to the application of international law and preference for domestic law, that application of IHL in its current form to the marero violence is unlikely.
E. International Human Rights Law's Role in the Conflict
El Salvador is bound by several International Human Rights treaties, including the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 286 The ICCPR obligates State Parties to undertake to ensure the rights contained in the covenant. 287 Under article 2, the positive obligations on States Parties to ensure Covenant rights will only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not just against violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights. 288 Several of the articles of the ICCPR might be implicated by the violent situation in El Salvador. Article 6, for example, states in relevant part that "[e]very human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." 289 This provision, combined with article 2, obliges El Salvador to prohibit the action of private citizens, such as mareros, from arbitrarily depriving anyone of life. Prior to the gang-truce, El Salvador aimed to meet its obligation through traditional suppression methods mixed with some rehabilitative measures. However, it could be argued that now that the truce has had substantial success in reducing arbitrary deprivation of life, El Salvador could not withdraw from the peace process without breaching its obligations under the ICCPR. However, practically speaking this is unlikely. As is the case with IHL, the enforcement of non-criminal-IHRL is [Vol. 24:3 largely executed by States, and it is unlikely that these States will go so far as to hold El Salvador in violation of its obligations under the ICCPR because of El Salvador's choice of crime reduction strategy for fear of future infringements on each State's own sovereignty in the area of domestic criminal law. The other problem with IHRL with respect to the marero conflict in El Salvador is that only State Parties are bound by IHRL agreements, which neither bind the actions of the mareros nor create alternate strategies for reducing violence.
F. How IHL & IHRL Inform the Truce in El Salvador
Although IHL and IHRL are unlikely to provide any immediate protection from violence or relief for the people of El Salvador, they are still likely to perform an important function in the peace process. The laws that make up the law of armed conflict and human rights law perform an important normative and moral function: "[T]hey serve as a moral and political yardstick by which public opinion and non-governmental groups and associations can appraise if, and to what extent, States misbehave." 290 Therefore IHL and IHRL have an important normative role to play in the peace process in El Salvador. The overall message of IHL is clear: "Regardless of the point of view, humanitarianism should be the focus . . . . To maximize humanitarian goals, legitimacy should not be a concern when engaging a group."
291 Arguably, norms accepted as part of IHL and IHRL are a group of norms which can form a basis for negotiation regarding particular forms of violence and recruiting as the peace process moves forward.
G. A Developing Body of Law Beyond Current International Law
International law has shifted and changed over time to keep pace with the changing nature of armed conflict. As an increasing amount of sustained armed conflict is related to criminal organizations, it is possible that States will become more open to the idea of creating humanitarian frameworks governing such conflicts. This includes an emerging "Law of Peace."
Even if a conflict is not subject to IHL, the parties are able to apply all or part of the Conventions to the conflict by agreement. 292 The Geneva Convention's safeguards for civilians in all conflicts can be rendered useless through the non-compliance of armed groups, putting civilians at highest risk. 293 
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LA MANO EXTENDIDA 801 agreeing to adhere to IHL norms is a state or armed group." 294 The former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan repeatedly encouraged negotiations with armed groups to protect civilians and provide access to them during armed conflicts, stating:
Whereas Governments are sometimes concerned that . . . engagements might legitimize armed groups, these concerns must be balanced against the urgent need for humanitarian action. It is the obligation to preserve the physical integrity of each and every civilian within their jurisdiction, regardless of gender, ethnicity, religion or political conviction, that should guide Governments in exercising their sovereign responsibility. 295 Therefore, in spite of the lack of application of IHL, a State may choose to nevertheless engage an armed group in direct peace negotiations in order to advance humanitarian aims, like El Salvador chose to do in the case of the maras.
International Humanitarian Law, International Human Rights Law, and domestic criminal law tend to all work to regulate and restrict violence. 296 However, there is no developed body of law that outlines the establishing of peace out of violent conflict. 297 Christine Bell, in her book On the Law of Peace, argues "the practice of negotiating peace agreements is producing a new law of the peace maker-or lex pacificatoria."
298 Bell examines contemporary peace agreements and distills theories about the form and function of contemporary peace agreements. She argues for an emerging enforceable law of peace that would apply to peace processes regardless of the application of IHL.
299
Of particular relevance to the peace process in El Salvador, Bell restates the norms established by contemporary peace agreements regarding transitional justice. 300 This statement of the new law of transitional justice is as follows:
(1) Blanket amnesties that cover serious international crimes are not permitted.
